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  1. 15 Feb, 2019 1 commit
  3. 14 Feb, 2019 3 commits
  5. 13 Feb, 2019 2 commits
  7. 12 Feb, 2019 6 commits
  9. 11 Feb, 2019 14 commits
    • Merge pull request #2844 from brauner/2019-02-11/licensing+ · b88ccedc
      Stéphane Graber authored 
      string_utils.h: fix wrong licensing
    • string_utils.h: fix wrong licensing · 84fa5aca
      Christian Brauner authored 
      liblxc has always been meant to be LGPLv2.1+ as reflected by the many
downstreams projects and bindings which are themselves under LGPLv2.1+ or other
licenses which would be incompatible with linking against a GPLv2+ library.

It's pretty normal for a library to be LGPL while binaries are GPL as a GPL
library would only ever be usable by other GPL-only projects, which isn't the
case for very many of the liblxc downstreams.

The issue here is really carelessness. None of those GPL headers were put there
intentionally, instead being wrongly copy/pasted from other parts of the
codebase which is indeed intended to be GPLv2+. This is also made clear in our
CONTRIBUTING file in this repository:

Licensing for new files:
------------------------

LXC is made of files shipped under a few different licenses.

Anything that ends up being part of the LXC library needs to be released
under LGPLv2.1+ or a license compatible with it (though the latter will
only be accepted for cases where the code originated elsewhere and was
imported into LXC).

Language bindings for the libraries need to be released under LGPLv2.1+.

Anything else (non-libraries) needs to be Free Software and needs to be
allowed to link with LGPLv2.1+ code (if needed). LXC upstream prefers
LGPLv2.1+ or GPLv2 for those.

When introducing a new file into the project, please make sure it has a
copyright header making clear under which license it's being released
and if it doesn't match the criteria described above, please explain
your decision on the lxc-devel mailing-list when submitting your patch.

This is intended to switch over files to LGPLv2.1+ to which end we have
collected ACKs from relevant people.
/* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Josh Soref <jsoref@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: 's avatarFabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Acked-by: 's avatarJosh Soref <jsoref@gmail.com>
    • Merge pull request #2843 from brauner/2019-02-11/fix_licensing_brauner · 9581e697
      Stéphane Graber authored 
      fix licensing headers
    • syscall_wrappers: fix wrong licensing · 7043a15d
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • ringbuf.h: fix wrong licensing · c423a0a7
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • memory_utils: fix wrong licensing · cd4a865d
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • rexec: fix wrong licensing · 2b3153a8
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: 's avatarAleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
    • api_extensions: fix wrong licensing · 3877934c
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • file_utils.h: fix wrong licensing · 6aae19f7
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • compiler: fix wrong licensing · b80e01bd
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • api_extensions: fix wrong licensing · 7fd02ed7
      Christian Brauner authored 
      /* Affected People */
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • Merge pull request #2841 from brauner/2019-02-11/fix_android · 9c63d38c
      Stéphane Graber authored 
      include: add fexecve() for Android's Bionic
    • include: add fexecve() for Android's Bionic · 9d361e0f
      Christian Brauner authored 
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
    • CVE-2019-5736 (runC): rexec callers as memfd · 6400238d
      Christian Brauner authored 
      Adam Iwaniuk and Borys Popławski discovered that an attacker can compromise the
runC host binary from inside a privileged runC container. As a result, this
could be exploited to gain root access on the host. runC is used as the default
runtime for containers with Docker, containerd, Podman, and CRI-O.

The attack can be made when attaching to a running container or when starting a
container running a specially crafted image.  For example, when runC attaches
to a container the attacker can trick it into executing itself. This could be
done by replacing the target binary inside the container with a custom binary
pointing back at the runC binary itself. As an example, if the target binary
was /bin/bash, this could be replaced with an executable script specifying the
interpreter path #!/proc/self/exe (/proc/self/exec is a symbolic link created
by the kernel for every process which points to the binary that was executed
for that process). As such when /bin/bash is executed inside the container,
instead the target of /proc/self/exe will be executed - which will point to the
runc binary on the host. The attacker can then proceed to write to the target
of /proc/self/exe to try and overwrite the runC binary on the host. However in
general, this will not succeed as the kernel will not permit it to be
overwritten whilst runC is executing. To overcome this, the attacker can
instead open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe using the O_PATH flag and then
proceed to reopen the binary as O_WRONLY through /proc/self/fd/<nr> and try to
write to it in a busy loop from a separate process. Ultimately it will succeed
when the runC binary exits. After this the runC binary is compromised and can
be used to attack other containers or the host itself.

This attack is only possible with privileged containers since it requires root
privilege on the host to overwrite the runC binary. Unprivileged containers
with a non-identity ID mapping do not have the permission to write to the host
binary and therefore are unaffected by this attack.

LXC is also impacted in a similar manner by this vulnerability, however as the
LXC project considers privileged containers to be unsafe no CVE has been
assigned for this issue for LXC. Quoting from the
https://linuxcontainers.org/lxc/security/ project's Security information page:

"As privileged containers are considered unsafe, we typically will not consider
new container escape exploits to be security issues worthy of a CVE and quick
fix. We will however try to mitigate those issues so that accidental damage to
the host is prevented."

To prevent this attack, LXC has been patched to create a temporary copy of the
calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to containers. To do this LXC
creates an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create() system call and
copies itself into the temporary in-memory file, which is then sealed to
prevent further modifications. LXC then executes this sealed, in-memory file
instead of the original on-disk binary. Any compromising write operations from
a privileged container to the host LXC binary will then write to the temporary
in-memory binary and not to the host binary on-disk, preserving the integrity
of the host LXC binary. Also as the temporary, in-memory LXC binary is sealed,
writes to this will also fail.

Note: memfd_create() was added to the Linux kernel in the 3.17 release.
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Co-Developed-by: 's avatarAlesa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Acked-by: 's avatarSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: 's avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
  11. 10 Feb, 2019 6 commits
  13. 09 Feb, 2019 8 commits