Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

- int lxc_make_controlling_pty()
- int lxc_login_pty()
- void lxc_pty_conf_free()
- void lxc_pty_info_init()
- void lxc_pty_init()
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

otherwise, we just get a return value of false from setting config failure,
with no indication as to what actually failed in the log.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>

* exit(1) when there is an option parsing error
* exit(0) when the user explicitly asks for help
* exit(1) when the user specifies an invalid option
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>

If 'lxc_cmd_get_name' failed and return with NULL, this would cause a segment fault.
Signed-off-by: LiFeng <lifeng68@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

When we deleted cgroups for unprivileged containers we used to allocate a new
mapping and clone a new user namespace each time we delete a cgroup. This of
course meant - on a cgroup v1 system - doing this >= 10 times when all
controllers were used. Let's not to do this and only allocate and establish a
mapping once.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

When fully unprivileged users run a container that only maps their own {g,u}id
and they do not have access to setuid new{g,u}idmap binaries we will write the
idmapping directly. This however requires us to write "deny" to
/proc/[pid]/setgroups otherwise any write to /proc/[pid]/gid_map will be
denied.

On a sidenote, this patch enables fully unprivileged containers. If you now set
lxc.net.[i].type = empty no privilege whatsoever is required to run a container.

Enhances #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Felix Abecassis <fabecassis@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

The existing check doesn't work, because when you statically
link a program against libc, any functions not called are not
included.  So cap_init() which we check for is not there in
the built binary.

So instead just check whether a "gcc -lcap -static" works.
If libcap.a is not available it will fail, if it is it will
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <shallyn@cisco.com>

Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>

Closes #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

If no id mapping for the container's root id is defined try to us the id
mappings specified via lxc.init.{g,u}id.

Closes #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Closes #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Closes #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

- mapped_hostid_entry()
- idmap_add()

Closes #2033.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

We don't allow non-pty devices anyway so don't let open() create unneeded
files.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

As the other tools already handle, show usage message when -h or --help
are used.
Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <marcos.souza.org@gmail.com>

The handler for the signal fd will detect when the init process of a container
has exited and cause the mainloop to close. However, this can happen before the
console handlers - or any other events for that matter - are handled. So in the
case of init exiting we still need to allow for all buffered input to the
console to be handled before exiting. This allows us to capture output from
short-lived init processes.

This is conceptually equivalent to my implementation of ExecReaderToChannel()
https://github.com/lxc/lxd/blob/master/shared/util_linux.go#L527

Closes #1694.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

This makes it clearer why handlers return what value.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

On set{g,u}id() the kernel does:

 	/* dumpability changes */
	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
	    !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
	    !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
	    !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
	    !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
		if (task->mm)
			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
		smp_wmb();
	}

which means we need to re-enable the deat signal after the set{g,u}id().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Since we are now dumpable we can open /proc/<child-pid>/ns/cgroup so let's
avoid the overhead of sending around fds.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

When set set{u,g}id() the kernel will make us undumpable. This is unnecessary
since we can guarantee that whatever is running inside the child process at
this point this is fully trusted by the parent. Making us dumpable let's users
use debuggers on the child process before the exec as well and also allows us
to open /proc/<child-pid> files in lieu of the child.
Note, that we only need to perform the prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) if our
effective uid on the host is not 0. If our effective uid on the host is 0 then
we will keep all capabilities in the child user namespace across set{g,u}id().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

This way we can rely on the kernel's copy-on-write support similar to fork().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

This is a copy-on-write (no stack passed) variant of lxc_clone().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>